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The notion of institutional entrepreneur (DiMaggio, 1988) has given rise to a controversy 
in neo-institutional theory around the ability of actors to distance themselves from 
institutional pressures, envision alternative institutional patterns, and act strategically to 
change institutions in which they are embedded. This paper empirically examines the 
ability of embedded actors to envision alternative institutional patterns, that is, their 
innovative capacity. We analyze the role that an individual played in the development of 
a new institutional logic of corporate social responsibility in Denmark between 2001 and 
2002. Based on our empirical findings on the innovative capacity of this individual, we 
propose a new definition of institutional entrepreneurs that is more compatible with the 
premises of neo-institutional theory than the one proposed by DiMaggio (1988). We 
propose that institutional entrepreneurs are institutionally bounded agents who a) 
transpose an institutional logic across fields and introduce it as a deliberate alternative to 
the institutional logic in the focal field, or b) deliberately seek to diffuse an alternative 
logic within a field. 
 
  
How can institutional entrepreneurs be innovative, given that they are institutionally 
embedded actors? This conundrum brings to the forefront an important challenge facing the 
literature on institutional entrepreneurship, namely the reconciliation of deliberate action with the 
notion of embedded agency. To address this issue, we empirically examine the innovative 
capacity of an institutionally embedded actor. Our analytical objective is to evaluate if 
institutional entrepreneurship holds promise as an endogenous explanation of institutional 
change.       
The literature on institutional entrepreneurship has emerged in response to the call for a 
better understanding of how and why institutions change. The latter questions remain notoriously 
difficult to answer, as acknowledged by some institutional theorists (e.g., DiMaggio & Powell, 
1991; Fligstein, 1991; Hoffman, 1999; Seo and Creed, 2002). That institutions change is beyond 
much doubt. But it is not entirely clear why institutions change, and how they do so (Barley & 
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Tolbert, 1997). Addressing the issue of the role of agency in institutional change, DiMaggio 
(1988) introduced the notion of institutional entrepreneurship in neo-institutional theory. He 
defined institutional entrepreneurs as actors who have an interest in modifying institutional 
structures or in creating new ones, and who have enough resources to do so. By developing this 
notion, DiMaggio put more emphasis on the role of actors and agency in institutional change 
processes. He thus revived dimensions of ‘old institutionalism’ (Selznick, 1949, 1956) that had 
been deemphasized in early neo-institutional studies (e.g., DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Meyer, 
Scott, & Deal, 1983; Tolbert, 1985; Tolbert & Zucker, 1983; Zucker, 1983). These early studies 
focused on the reproduction of institutional elements and saw the forces leading to institutional 
change as exogenous to a particular field.  
The notion of institutional entrepreneurship is a source of controversy among neo-
institutionalists. Part of this controversy has to do with the fact that neo-institutional theory broke 
with rational actor models by proposing that organizational behavior is shaped by institutions 
rather than by instrumental calculations (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Meyer & Rowan, 1977).  
Neo-institutionalist studies convincingly demonstrate that actors are institutionally embedded and 
that social systems change as a result of aggregated actions by institutionally embedded actors 
who behave in conformity with the given institutional order in a field. Consequently, they 
challenged the assertion of rational actor models that individuals are free to set goals and pursue 
them deliberately if they so desire. The problem with DiMaggio’s definition of  institutional 
entrepreneur was that it could be regarded as a return to rational actor models. His definition gave 
rise to a controversy around the ability of actors to distance themselves from institutional 
pressures and to act strategically. One objection was that if actors are institutionally embedded, 
then how can they have interests that diverge from the institutional order that shape them? And, 
how can they envision alternative options? These questions allude to the apparent contradiction 
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between institutional determinism and agency, also referred to as the ‘paradox of embedded 
agency’ (Holm, 1995; Seo & Creed, 2002).  
One the one hand, the notion of institutional entrepreneur is seemingly in contradiction with 
the core of neo-institutional theory. On the other hand, neo-institutional theorists have devoted 
increasing attention to explaining institutional change over the last 15 years, and many have 
expressed growing dissatisfaction with exogenous explanations. As Zucker (1988) underlined, if 
change always comes from a higher level in the system, the logical fallacy of infinite regression 
to another higher level is an obvious problem. Though neo-institutional theory has successfully 
refuted rational actor models, it still struggles to explain how some actions count relatively more 
than do other actions towards institutional change. Unless, of course, differential impact of 
actions are fully attributable to chance, external events, or structural positions of actors. But these 
explanations are increasingly regarded as insufficient explanations of institutional change (Dacin, 
Goodstein, & Scott, 2002). The notion of institutional entrepreneur, proposed as a way to address 
this problem, offers an endogenous explanation of institutional change (e.g., Beckert, 1999; 
DiMaggio, 1988; Fligstein, 1997; Garud et al., 2002; Holm, 1995; Rao, 1998). While this 
endogenous explanation is promising, it still struggles with the paradox of embedded agency. If 
institutional entrepreneurship is to gain wide recognition in the field as an endogenous 
explanation of institutional change, researchers must explain how actors can envision new 
institutional patterns and act in non-conformity with the institutions that supposedly govern their 
behavior. Seo and Creed (2002) have called for the necessity to address empirically this puzzle.  
Our quest in this paper is to empirically examine a key dimension of the paradox of 
embedded agency, namely the innovative capacity of embedded actors. We define innovative 
capacity as the ability of actors, who are institutionally embedded, to envision alternative 
institutional patterns. We conceptualize institutional patterns as institutional logics, defined as 
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collective means-end designations that represent shared understandings in a field of what goals to 
pursue and how to pursue them (Scott, 1987, 1994a). Collective means-ends designations are the 
“mundane, taken-for-granted relationships between means and ends that have the tone, ‘this is 
how the world works’ ” (Dobbin, 1994:13). Institutional logics are means-ends designations that 
are so self-evident to actors that they are never fully or systematically articulated (Hirschman, 
1977, in Dobbin, 1994: 13).  Institutional logics are very persistent to change (Dobbin, 1994; 
Friedland & Alford, 1991) because actors, genuinely believing institutional logics to be 
objectively true, rarely subject them to scrutiny (Berger & Luckmann, 1966; Dobbin, 1994). 
Thus, an alternative institutional pattern is a means-end designation that has not previously been 
considered as a potential replacement for the institutional logic in a field. More precisely, by 
actors ‘innovative capacity’ we mean the ability of actors to cognitively conceive of a new 
means-end designation that differs from the institutional logic of a field. We do not pretend that 
innovative capacity necessarily leads to institutional change. However, space does not permit due 
attention in this paper to the subsequent steps of enacting a new cognitive pattern in practice or 
diffusing it in the field.   
In the frame of this paper, we restrict our focus to individual agency. To investigate the 
innovative capacity of embedded individuals, we conducted an empirical case study in real time. 
The case study is drawn from the organizational field of Denmark. Previous empirical research 
has found the nation state to constitute an organizational field (Dobbin, 1994). We examined how 
a group of individuals, embedded in this field, came to conceive of a previously unavailable 
means-end designation as an alternative to the institutional logic underpinning the Danish 
institution of corporate social responsibility. The analysis, drawing out the most significant 
dimensions of the data, examines the cognitive process through which one actor, in collaboration 
with others, came to conceive of this alternative means-end designation. In reconstructing the 
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notion of ’corporate social responsibility’, this person acted deliberately, which makes the case 
rather extreme. Not all innovations are as deliberate as suggests this case. An extreme case is 
very useful, though, because ”if the processes involved in the extreme case are clarified, those of 
less extreme cases will be understood more easily” (Berger & Luckmann, 1967:157). The high 
level of self-awareness of this one individual facilitates the investigation of the innovative 
process, which is otherwise rather inaccessible to researchers.  
The paper proceeds as follows. We first introduce the theoretical framework on which we 
rely to analyze human agency throughout the paper. Then, we apply it empirically to investigate 
the innovative (projective) capacity of institutionally embedded individuals. We subsequently 
present key empirical findings and discuss them in relation to the literature on institutional 
entrepreneurship. We conclude the paper with a proposal for a better definition of institutional 
entrepreneurship and with our recommendations for future research that pursues this line of 
inquiry.  
 
THE NOTION OF AGENCY 
The notion of agency is used extensively in social sciences, but it is often given different 
definitions, thus rendering it a vague term. It is associated with words such as motivation, will, 
purpose, intentionality, interest, choice, initiative, freedom, and creativity. For example, Scott 
(2001) considers that agency refers to an actor’s ability to intentionally pursue interest and to 
have some effect on the social world, altering the rules or the distribution of resources. According 
to Sewell (1992), to be an agent means to be capable of exerting some degree of control over the 
social relations, in which one is enmeshed, which in turn implies the ability to transform those 
relations to some degree. These definitions portray agency as a unidimensional concept that can 
be represented on a continuum between high and low levels of agency. Moreover, relying on this 
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definition, one may be tempted to regard agency as a fixed individual attribute: some people have 
a high level of agency whereas others do not. Agency may, in fact, vary depending on the context 
in which individuals are embedded and it may evolve through time.  
Instead of viewing agency as a unidimensional concept, we propose to view it as 
multidimensional one in order to overcome the paradox of embedded agency (Battilana, 2004). 
Relying on the definition developed by Emirbayer and Mische (1998), we define agency as the 
actors’ engagement (in the social world), which, through the interplay of habit, imagination, and 
judgment, both reproduces and tranforms the environment’s structures. According to this 
definition agency comprises three constitutive elements: iteration, projectivity, and practical 
evaluation (Emirbayer & Mische, 1998: 970-971). The ‘iterational element’ refers to the 
selective reactivation by actors of past patterns of thought and action, as routinely incorporated 
in practical activity. The iterational element of agency gives stability and order to social 
universes and helps to sustain identities, interactions, and institutions over time. It corresponds to 
the actors’ reproductive capacity. The second dimension of agency, i.e., ‘projectivity’, 
encompasses the imaginative generation by actors of possible future trajectories of action, in 
which received structures of thought and action may be creatively reconfigured in relation to 
actors’ hopes, fears, and desires for the future. It corresponds to what we call the innovative 
capacity of actors throughout the paper. Finally, the ‘practical-evaluative’ element of agency 
refers to the actors’ capacity to make practical and normative judgments among alternative 
possible trajectories of action, in response to the emerging demands, dilemmas, and ambiguities 
of presently evolving situations. In other terms, it is the actors’ reflective capacity. Emirbayer 
and Mische thus conceptualize agency as a temporally embedded process of social engagement, 
informed by the past (in its habitual aspect), oriented toward the future (as a capacity to imagine 
alternative possibilities), and practiced in the present (as a capacity to contextualize past habits 
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and future projects within the contingencies of the moment). In other words, human agency 
potentially comprises a reproductive, an innovative and a reflective dimension. These three 
dimensions of agency interact dynamically with one another (Emirbayer & Mische, 1998: 972), 
and one dimension may be relatively more pronounced than another, depending on the context 
and actor.  
The reproductive dimension of human agency is fully compatible with neo-institutional 
theory in as much as all actors are assumed capable of reproducing the institutions in their field. 
As for the reflective dimension of agency, neo-institutional theory accounts for it by stating that 
actors are more likely to distance themselves from existing institutions when they encounter 
contradictory institutions (Clemens and Cook, 1999; Oliver, 1992; Seo and Creed, 2002). The 
experience of contradictory institutions triggers individuals’ reflective capacity in that they no 
longer take the existing institutional arrangements for granted. In contrast, it seems more 
complicated to account for the innovative dimension of agency within the frame of neo-
institutional theory. DiMaggio’s (1988) definition of institutional entrepreneurs has two 
implications regarding institutional entrepreneurs’ agentic orientation. First, to behave as 
institutional entrepreneurs, individuals must perceive that they have an interest in changing the 
existing institutional order. To do so, they must be able to distance themselves from the existing 
institutional arrangements. Therefore, institutional entrepreneurs are assumed to be able to make 
critical judgements about the reality they face, which means that the reflective dimension of their 
agency plays an important role. Second, by proposing that actors can develop new institutional 
projects, DiMaggio (1988) implicitly takes into account the innovative dimension of agency. 
Actors would not be able to conceive of new projects if they did not have an innovative capacity. 
On the whole, he implicitly makes the assumption that some actors, i.e., institutional 
entrepreneurs, are characterized both by a reflective and innovative agentic capacity. Between 
 7
these two capacities, we focus on the latter, which we consider the most controversial dimension 
of human agency in relation to neo-institutional theory. It is not clear how actors can be 
simultaneously innovative and institutionally embedded.  Recognizing that the three dimensions 
of human agency are intrinsically related to one another, we try in this paper to single out the 
innovative capacity of embedded actors for empirical investigation.   
 
METHODOLOGY 
Since our analytical objective is to examine the innovative capacity of institutionally 
embedded actors, we seek to investigate only one dimension of human agency, namely 
projectivity. Not only do we target only one dimension of human agency, we also restrict 
innovation to its deliberate, forward-looking form. Innovation as a spontaneous, emergent 
process is not explored in this paper.    
To investigate actors’ innovative capacity, we use a qualitative case study from year 2002. 
The case study is a new project on corporate social responsibility and diversity management, 
funded in part by two large Danish firms in the service industry, and in part by a European Union 
(EU) fund. The data pool, from which selective parts are drawn, contain non-participant 
observations of project group meetings over six months from December 2001 to May 2002, 
interviews with ten key project members, written material used or produced during the initial 
stage of this project, and supplementary field-level data in the form of governmental policies and 
laws, newspaper articles, and field observations in Denmark from fall 2001 to summer 2002. 
We use qualitative methods to analyze data. The unit of analysis is the means-end 
designation, which is composed of a means and an end. We map means-ends designations across 
levels of analysis so as to identify the emergence and origin of a means-end designation that is 
alternative to the institutional logic that already exists in the field. For a means-end designation to 
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be regarded as an institutional logic, it has to permeate the field to such an extent that it is taken-
for-granted by field members. Means-ends designations can also be shared only by a group of 
field members or by a single individual in that particular field. To identify a new means-end 
designation at the individual level, identified means-ends designations are placed at the highest 
warranted level of analysis so as to de-clutter lower levels of analysis where innovative capacity 
is most likely to occur. Finally, we triangulate data sources with one another so as to minimize 
post-rationalization, window-dressing, and mistaken aggregation. 
 
FINDINGS 
The findings we present demonstrate the innovative capacity of one individual actor. To 
reiterate, actors’ innovative capacity is defined as their ability to cognitively conceive of a new 
means-end designation that differs from the existing institutional logics of a field.  Previous 
research indicates that institutional logics shape the sorts of means that people can envision when 
trying to solve a problem (Dobbin, 1994: 230). Hence, the innovative capacity is understood as 
the ability to envision new means to solve a problem. The following case study shows the process 
through which one actor came to conceive of a new solution to a long-standing problem. Table 1 
contains a chronological overview of events, divided along three levels of analysis (society,  
project, and individual).   
 
The problem  
In year 2000, a report from the Danish government acknowledges the difficulty of 
integrating immigrants and ethnic minorities in the Danish workforce. “The unemployment rate 
of ethnic minorities is almost 17% as opposed to 5.6% in the remaining population, … a problem 
that both the government and labor market partners consider very important to address” 
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(Partsudvalget om integration, 2000: 4). Apparently, this problem is very present in year 2000. 
Figure 1, the results of a keyword search in a large Danish newspaper, shows a dramatic increase 
in attention to this problem from 1999 to 2000. In average, the newspaper publishes almost one 
article per day on this topic in 2000 and 2001. The actor remarks the growing attention to this 
problem:  “When I leave Denmark in 1995, we have gender equality on the agenda. Five years 
later, when I return, ethnic equality has moved to the top of the Danish agenda.” The problem 
may have important consequences for Danish society, as explains another interviewee:  
Danish society will become more and more multiethnic with time. If we cannot get 
people who are different from one another to work together in the workplace, there is 
not much hope of creating cohesion in society as a whole. Then we will see greater 
and greater polarization between people with different ethnic backgrounds, between 
the highly educated and the poorly educated, between people in good and less good 
economic circumstances, and this will lead to a lack of social cohesion. That is not a 
very nice society to imagine living in. (Project manager) 
 
Not only is the problem important, it is also tenacious. The government and labor market 
partners, who “consider this problem very important to address” (ibid), have in fact been trying to 
address it for years. Apparently to little avail.  
  
The institutionalized solution: National solidarity  
The Social Democratic government and its labor market partners began to address this 
problem in 1994. That year, the government launched a campaign on ‘corporate social 
responsibility’ (CSR). The CSR campaign aimed at mobilizing Danish firms to take active part in 
labor market policy. Firms were requested to hire passive income recipients, particularly 
immigrants, refugees, and disabled individuals, and to retain employees at risk of prematurely 
leaving the workforce due to long-term illness or temporarily reduced working capacity. By 
acting in this way, firms would contribute to meeting governmental objectives.  
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The governmental motive behind the CSR campaign was clearly socio-economic. 
Demographic projections in the mid-1990s predicted higher demand on public support programs 
in the future, mainly from the aging population, the growing number of first and second 
generation immigrants outside the labor force, and an increasing proportion of single-parent 
families in Danish society (Ministry of Labor et al., 2001: 8). If these trends were not reversed, 
public services would have to be lowered in 2010. To circumvent this line of development, the 
government could increase taxes, allow more immigration, or activate more passive income 
recipients. Opting for the latter orientation, the Social Democratic government launched the CSR 
campaign in 1994 and pursued it until 2001 when the Liberal party was elected to form the new 
government.     
The CSR campaign gave rise to a CSR policy, referred to locally as the policy on the 
inclusive labor force. The means-end designation that underpins this policy is portrayed in Figure 
2. This figure shows a means-end designation where solidarity (the means) leads to 
socioeconomic development of the welfare state (the end). Solidarity was to take the form of 
integrating and retaining people excluded from the labor force. This means-end designation is 
identical to dominant institutions and previous national policy orientations in the field, much as 
predicts comparative research on national policies (Dobbin, 1994). Through the CSR campaign, 
the means-end designation (Figure 2) diffused across the field in the late 1990s. This diffusion 
pattern is reflected in Figure 3, which shows that Danish newspaper articles on CSR emerged 
after the launch of the CSR campaign in 1994 and increased in numbers during the latter part of 
the 1990s. By year 2000, the means-end designation in Figure 2 had become institutionalized. It 
was now widely known and largely synonymous with CSR (field notes). Most importantly: it 
constituted the taken-for-granted solution to the problem of integrating immigrants. It was 
obviously true to field members that if everyone showed solidarity by integrating and retaining 
 11
people in the workforce, then the Danish welfare state would develop optimally. Thus, this 
means-ends designation had become the institutionalized solution to the problem of integrating 
immigrants.  
The CSR policy and campaign was more than mere window-dressing; it was not a case of 
decoupling from the government’s perspective. To incite firms to meet governmental policy 
objectives, the CSR campaign emphasized the moral duty of firms to participate in protecting the 
Danish welfare state: “Firms must act in the collective interests of the nation, not expecting to 
derive financial benefits from every act of inclusion and social responsibility” [translated from 
Danish] (Ministry of Labor et al., 2001: 21). In stressing a moral duty to society, the government 
evoked a normative institution in Denmark. Actors, whether individuals or firms, should pursue 
solidarity and the common good of society and refrain from self-interested action. As a 
complement to this normative institution, the government designed and implemented a range of 
financial incentive programs, including compensation, rewards, certification, and benchmarking 
of firms (e.g., www.detsocialeindex.dk; Kruhøffer & Høgelund, 2001). It also established social 
partnerships, that is, administrative interfaces between the government and its labor market 
partners, in order to remove administrative or legal barriers to policy implementation.  
While the CSR campaign proved relatively successful in integrating other subgroups of the 
population (see Kruhøffer & Høgelund, 2001), the integration of immigrants turned out to be 
more difficult than expected. Despite six years of intense CSR campaigning, the integration of 
immigrants remained a tenacious problem in year 2000. Hence, when the above-mentioned report 
on the integration of immigrants was published in year 2000, the context was one of largely failed 
efforts to solve the problem of integrating immigrants. Not for a lack of effort on the part of 
government and labor market partners. The institutionalized solution had simply proved 
ineffective.  
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A certain level of de-institutionalization sets in. De-institutionalization gains further 
momentum due to two precipitating jolts in 2001: the election of a Liberal government in 
Denmark, and the publication of the European Commission’s Green Paper on Corporate Social 
Responsibility. The latter contains a definition of corporate social responsibility that is much 
broader than the one institutionalized in Denmark during the previous seven years. This disparity, 
combined with the ideological shift in government, opened up for local innovations. The 
institutional change model developed by Greenwood, Suddaby and Hinings (2002) predicts, in 
fact, that precipitating jolts precede de-institutionalization, which is then followed by a local 
innovation.      
 
An alternative solution: Diversity management 
In 2001, two large Danish firms in the service sector submit a shared application to a 
European Union fund. This fund invests in innovative partnership projects that are aligned with 
EU labor market policy in the sense of seeking to integrate and maintain as many people as 
possible in the active labor force and promoting equality between them. The project application 
to this fund contains a proposal for an innovative project on diversity management and corporate 
social responsibility, the latter being understood as the integration and maintenance of people in 
the active labor force (Figure 2). Diversity management, being the innovative dimension, is the 
managerial practice of identifying and developing individual strengths of employees so as to 
generate synergies that increase the financial performance of the firm. The underlying logic of 
diversity management,  portrayed in Figure 4, shows that the recruitment and development of 
employees with undeveloped human potential (means) lead to increased financial performance of 
the firm (end). In fact, the benefit of diversity management is supposedly three-fold: the firm 
optimizes its financial performance, the individual employee develops personally, and society 
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improves on socioeconomic measures. The project is granted preliminary funding in fall 2001, 
and receives full funding for three years from the European Union and the two participating firms 
in spring 2002.  
The innovative idea in the proposal is to implement diversity management as a new form of 
corporate social responsibility. The expected benefit of this reformulation of CSR is that diversity 
management will make it more attractive for firms to take on social responsibility, particularly in 
the form of integrating immigrants in the labor force. Doing so was less attractive for firms under 
the governmental CSR policy, which did not contain much incentive for firms to integrate 
immigrants. The new formulation emphasizes a win-win approach. In terms of concrete practice, 
the project proposes to implement diversity management by recruiting and integrating 
immigrants, women in management, troubled youth, and physically challenged individuals.  
As CSR is re-conceptualized, an alternative means-end designation emerges. This alternative 
means-end designation is developed as actors superimpose diversity management (Figure 4) upon 
the institutional logic underpinning corporate social responsibility (Figure 2). The result is the 
alternative means-end designation portrayed in Figure 5. This figure shows a combination 
between the institutional logic of the governmental CSR policy (Figure 2) and the logic of 
diversity management (Figure 4). What is strikingly new in this reformulation of CSR is the 
focus on individual characteristics and the proposition that people should be treated differently to 
generate equality in society. These characteristics are radically at odds with the dominant 
institutional logic of equality in the field, which is portrayed in Figure 6. The figure shows 
homogeneity between people, not differentiation, to be the proper means to equality. The re-
conceptualization of CSR thus introduces a means-ends designation that breaks with a dominant 
institutional logic in the field. The question then emerges, how was it possible for the firms to 
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develop such an alternative institutional pattern that broke with a dominant institutional logic in 
the field? 
The project initiators were three Danish women who met at an information session on EU 
funding in spring 2001. Being in mid-career, they knew each other from university where they 
pursued gender studies. Since then, all three of them had maintained a strong interest in social 
equality, including the new practice of diversity management. Moreover, at least two of them had 
been exposed to ethnic diversity in the workplace through international work assignments. 
Following the information session, the three women contacted two firms for which they worked 
as external or internal consultants. They asked the firms to participate in the project, which they 
accepted. Some months later, these firms applied for EU funding to the innovative project. When 
the project received preliminary funding in 2001, a project group was established to implement 
the innovative ideas in practice. The project group consisted primarily of employees and 
managers in human resources (HR), internal and external consultants, and researchers 
knowledgeable about this topic. The project initiators belonged to this group, one of them being 
project manager and the other two external consultants. Attached were also higher-level 
managers and internal communication agents. While all participating individuals played a role in 
the project formulation, we focus here on the innovative capacity of one of the three project 
initiators, who is an external consultant. The reason for this focus is that she is particularly 
articulate and reflexive about her own cognitive process, which facilitates the analysis of her 
innovative capacity. In the following, we show how she reconstructs the events and thoughts that 
led her, in interaction with the other initiators and group members, to propose diversity 
management as an alternative means-end designation to the problem of integrating immigrants in 
Denmark.  
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In 2000, when the problem of integrating immigrants in the Danish workforce received 
much media attention, this woman, an HR consultant in mid-career, returns to Denmark after a 
five year assignment at the World Bank in the United States. She experiences the problem of 
integrating immigrants in light of her experience abroad:        
In year 2000, I come home to a country that has not at all worked with the problem of 
integrating immigrants, and I come with the knowledge that it is feasible to do it 
differently elsewhere. I have seen it done in United States, and I also know that it is 
possible to integrate immigrants in Canada, a country similar to Denmark in many 
ways.  
 
In this quote, she makes a parallel between Denmark and Canada/US. This parallel, combined 
with a shared goal of integrating immigrants, makes it possible to consider a means from one 
field as potentially transposable to another field. This construction allows her to present the 
solution from Canada/US as potentially applicable in Denmark. She further states that the 
solution adopted in Canada/US is more effective than the one used in Denmark. The superior 
effectiveness of the foreign means makes it attractive, not just possible, to transpose the solution 
across fields. Thus, the quote shows a cognitive process that makes it possible to transpose a 
means-end designation across fields. We can infer at this point that her innovative capacity 
apparently consists in an ability to bridge two fields by means of a shared goal, and then 
transpose an alternative, superior means from one field to the other.   
This transposed means-end designation is, of course, diversity management (see Figure 4). 
She locates the origin of diversity management in the World Bank (US) where it emerged in 1998 
as a combination between ethnic equality and gender equality:    
In 1994, I am headhunted to the World Bank because of my extensive experience with 
women and equality. My role is to continue their program on gender equality. Then it 
happens in the history of the World Bank that there is a shift from a sole focus on 
gender issues to a focus on racial issues as well. Some people think that the World 
Bank – which has workers from all over the world – is having problems recruiting 
blacks. Then they hire a senior advisor on racial equality. And then we have one 
advisor on gender and one on race, and you can continue the list so that you get one on 
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handicap as well. They also have one of those now. They decide to put them under one 
umbrella, called ’diversity management’, and ask me – now we are in ’98 – to manage 
the implementation of these diversity management programs. I act as advisor on 
gender, and manager of the Diversity Management Program in ’98, ’99 and 2000, as 
long as I am there.  
  
This quote explains the emergence of diversity management in the World Bank. It shows that the 
concept appeared in United States a few years prior to its first appearence in Denmark. According 
to a Danish keyword search, diversity management appears in the library of Copenhagen 
Business School around year 2000, and in the public media two years later (see Figure 7). These 
data lend support to the thesis that the alternative solution is not new in an absolute sense, but is 
transposed from another field. Thus, the transposed object is a new means, diversity management, 
to a shared goal, the integration of immigrants. Moreover, the transposition occurs across two 
fields in which the actor is embedded.    
Individuals who are embedded in two different fields can transpose institutional logics from 
one field to another (Sewell, 1992). The project initiator does in fact suggest a transposition 
across fields in which she is herself embedded. This choice of fields indicates that she searches 
for solutions within her own cognitive repertoire. Cognitive repertoires are extended when actors 
become embedded in new fields that are different from the field(s) of their childhood (Berger & 
Luckmann, 1967). To become embedded in a new field, actors must undergo secondary 
socialization. This process can be very demanding and lengthy, particularly if the institutions in 
the two fields conflict with one another (Berger & Luckmann, 1967: 157-163). The woman in 
this case study has probably undergone secondary socialization during her five-year work 
assignment in the United States. She has most probably internalized institutions from this foreign 
field, which are now available in her cognitive repertoire. It is likely that she retrieves the object 
of transposition, i.e. diversity management, from her cognitive repertoire. This retrieval may not 
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have been possible, had diversity management not been available in her cognitive repertoire at 
the time the problem of integrating immigrants presented itself. In fact, judging from the quote 
below, she might not have been able to identify diversity management as a potential solution to 
the problem in the first place:  
I get a shock when I return to Denmark in year 2000 because the debate on immigrants 
and refugees has become quite ugly and hateful. Now I have been in a country, United 
States, where it is common to work with turning these sentiments of aggression and 
anger into something constructive. So it was not very pleasant to return to this narrow-
minded, condescending debate in Denmark. What I remember best from that summer 
is a newspaper article by Skov Kristensen from Danish Industry who suggested that we 
work more with a diversity perspective.  
  
The quote shows that she registers only one proposition, diversity management, presumably 
among many other objectively available propositions for how to solve the problem. Another 
person, with another cognitive repertoire, may have registered different propositions in the debate 
that summer. Hence, the data lends support to the claim that multiple embeddedness is the basic 
source for generating alternative institutional patterns (Berger & Luckmann, 1967: 157-163; 
Sewell, 1992). It also predicts that potential objects of transposition are limited to those available 
in actors’ cognitive repertoire. We may thus add at this point that the innovative capacity 
apparently consists in the ability to transpose an alternative means to a given end across fields, 
via a cognitive repertoire that is bounded by the fields in which an actor is embedded.   
Having been developed, the alternative means-end designation is the object of some 
negotiation in the group. It is later modified somewhat to enhance its legitimacy and potential for 
field-wide diffusion. Space does not permit us to elaborate upon the subsequent processes of 
negotiation, implementation and diffusion. Only to say that this alternative means-end 
designation is adopted later that year by the new Liberal government as the foundation for their 
new CSR policy. The governmental adoption exposes the new means-end designation as a viable 
alternative to the established institutional logic in the field.    
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 Governmental adoption  
In 2002, the government, now Liberal, adopts diversity management as a new orientation to 
corporate social responsibility. It does so in fall 2002 after a governmental conference on 
corporate social responsibility and the inclusive labor force:    
The starting point [for inclusiveness] must be the particular situation and skills of the 
individual – not the use of rigid laws and regulations./…The targeted groups for 
inclusiveness differ on gender, age, ethnic background, education and physical and 
mental resources. Therefore, it is almost self-evident that they in some situations must be 
treated differently to create equal opportunities! (Minister of Labor, September 6, 2002)   
 
Prior to adopting a new policy orientation as an alternative solution to the problem, the 
government requested a literature review on diversity management as a potential new approach to 
corporate social responsibility. The first volume, published in 2002, states that ”The Danish 
National Institute of Social Research (SFI) conducts until 2003 a research program on inclusion 
in the labour force, initiated by the Ministry of Social Affairs. The present literature review is the 
first phase of the project Diversity Management – a potential contribution to labour force 
inclusion? ” [my translation] (Kamp & Rasmussen, 2002: 1). Shortly after, in fall 2002, a panel 
of experts on diversity management presented their ideas at a governmental CSR conference 
(www.bm.dk/eu/formandskab/konferencer/skagen/Program_skagen.pdf). It is possible, though by 
no means sure, that these experts informed the government about the innovative project on 
diversity management and corporate social responsibility in the two large Danish firms.   
It is not surprising that the government may take inspiration from local innovations when 
developing new policies. One theoretical model of institutional change predicts, in fact, that new 
institutional patterns come about as collective actors, such as the government, adopt local 
innovations and theorize them (Greenwood, Hinings & Suddaby, 2002). Theorization is the 
process of generalizing a local innovation in such a way that it becomes a real alternative to an 
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institutional logic (ibid). Given the timing, it is quite plausible that the reconceptualization of 
CSR, proposed by the government, was inspired, at least in part, by the innovative local project 
on diversity management and corporate social responsibility. There may have been other 
inspirational sources as well. 
 
DISCUSSION 
The case presentation showed how one individual generated an alternative means-end designation 
that differed from the institutional logic in the field. We suggest that this process displays her 
innovative capacity, and that this innovative capacity makes her qualify potentially as an 
institutional entrepreneur. A number of possible objections may be raised to this conclusion. Let 
us therefore address five possible objections before discussing the theoretical implications of our 
findings.  
 
Potential objections  
Firstly, how do we know that this individual  did not copy the alternative solution from others in 
the field?  It is quite possible that other field members were also contemplating diversity 
management as a potential solution to the problem of integrating immigrants. Given that, this 
project could potentially be copying ideas from a concurrent project on diversity management in 
the field. There are no indications of such inspirational sources in the data. No Danish sources or 
examples are mentioned in discussions on how to implement diversity management or how to 
combine it with corporate social responsibility (field notes and interviews). The data suggest that 
the project is a front-runner, though there may potentially have been simultaneous initiatives in 
the field that also inspired the government to adopt this alternative means-end designation.   
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 Secondly, how do we know that the selection of a transposable element is attributable to 
the actor, and not to institutions? It is indeed difficult to separate these two sources. We suggest 
that actors are able to make selections within their cognitive repertoire, but that institutions 
influence the selection process. Institutions may indeed make transposing actors more likely to 
select one available institutional element over another. The transposition in the present case 
study was indeed aligned with the general direction of institutional change, that is, away from 
collectivism and towards individualism, as explains the transposing actor: 
Another societal tendency we see these days is a movement from a societal 
orientation to an individualized one. We change perspective from a very collectivist 
model to a more individualist model. It is still social – not a-social - because we are 
still together. And it is not simply because we now have a Liberal, right-wing 
government. The new government is explicit about this agenda, but the trend is much 
broader. The focus on individuals is a reflection of our present times, whether we 
have a Social Democratic or a Liberal government 
 
This quote suggests that the transposition, diversity management, is aligned with the general 
direction of institutional change in the field. This alignment influences the selection process at the 
individual level. It may also explain the selection process at the field level in the sense that the 
transposition is perceived as legitimate and innovative in the focal field. For instance, it may be 
difficult to generate financial resources and mobilize support to implement a transposition that 
does not qualify as legitimate and innovative in the focal field. Hence, selection processes are tied 
to the general direction of institutional change in the focal field. We may therefore add that the 
innovative capacity of embedded actors is probably limited to transpositions that are aligned with 
the general direction of institutional change in a field.  
 Thirdly, do we suggest than all actors with an innovative capacity qualify as institutional 
entrepreneurs? Certainly not. It is one thing to transpose a solution from another field to solve a 
particular problem in the focal field; it is quite another to do so deliberately with the explicit intent 
of  causing institutional change. Since the actor in the case study tried to solve a problem in the 
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field, the process may well be one of unintended institutional change. If so, she may be a local 
innovator, but not an institutional entrepreneur. She did, however, express a deliberate intent to 
change institutions:   
I would like to turn around the attitude that some people are different from the norm 
and that it is a problem we must compensate for, to saying instead that ‘there really are 
a lot of resources in this’. To turn around this defensive strategy and be more 
proactively and energetic, and celebrate differences. We are not happy with 
differences. The Danish mentality works against differences, because we are so 
equalizing. We do not like differences.  
 
In this quote, she presents an agenda that goes beyond mere problem solving. In fact, she 
explicitly advocates de-institutionalization of the institutional logic of equality (Figure 6) and 
proposes that it be replaced with a celebration of individual differences. As such, she deliberately 
intends to remove the normative institution that prevents the entry of diversity management in the 
field. Since her intent is expressed so clearly, it is fair to conclude that she deliberately pursued 
institutional change. It may be, though, that her initial motivation was to solve the problem, and 
that she subsequently generated this institutional change agenda when she realized that normative 
institutions prevented the adoption and implementation of the proposed alternative solution. If 
this interpretation is correct, then the transposition probably occurred prior to her intent to cause 
institutional change. We propose, therefore, that problem solving and deliberating institutional 
change are two consecutive steps in the process of generating an alternative institutional pattern. 
In this case, they happened to be performed by the same actor, but less extreme cases may 
separate the two processes. We further propose that only the second step be considered an act of 
institutional entrepreneurship. 
Fourthly, how do we know that her intent to cause institutional change is not a case of post-
rationalization? Data was collected real-time prior to governmental adoption of a new policy, 
which implies that the data contain only projective statements, that is, the hoped-for effects of the 
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project. If it were post-rationalization, she would not have been able to voice her intentions prior 
to the governmental adoption of diversity management as a new orientation to CSR. It is possible, 
of course, that simultaneous encounters took place with governmental agents, which increased her 
confidence that the alternative means-end designation may subsequently be adopted by the 
government. However, had project members been confident about subsequent adoption and 
diffusion of the new means-end designation at the governmental level, they probably would not 
have required us as researchers to ensure individual and firm anonymity due to the political nature 
of the project and the uncertainty of the outcome.  
Finally, are we implying that a single individual can change the institutional order? No, 
definitely not. In this case study, a multitude of factors, including a tenacious field level problem, 
precipitating jolts, and partial de-institutionalization, made it possible for an individual to propose 
an alternative institutional pattern by combining two institutional logics available in her cognitive 
repertoire. Moreover, the interactions between group members with complementary 
organizational roles, attachments and routines, played a significant role in molding the 
transposition into a form that lends itself to diffusion, that is, a form that is innovative, yet 
continuous with existing practices in the two firms and at several levels of management. 
Institutional change processes may take other forms than the one observed in this case study. 
Agreeing with Jepperson (1991), we do not pretend that the actions of institutional entrepreneurs 
are the only possible sources of institutional change. Institutional change processes are complex 
processes that involve different types of forces. We do not intend to suggest that endogenous 
sources of change are the only possible sources of change, nor that individuals constitute 
autonomous change agents. 
Assuming that the most important objections have been addressed in a satisfactory manner, 
we can conclude that actors are apparently able to innovate, but only within a restricted 
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institutional range. At a general level, we propose that the innovative capacity of an actor is the 
ability to establish parallels between fields in which the actor is embedded and to transpose a 
means-end designation across fields, required that the transposed means-end designation is 
available within the cognitive repertoire of the transposing actor, that the end in the transposed 
means-end designation is similar to an institutional logic in the focal field, and that the 
transposed means is congruent with the general direction of institutional change in this field. On 
the basis of this conclusion, we now turn to a discussion of its theoretical implications.  
 
Theoretical implications     
Our definition of actors’ innovative capacity can be related to previous work on the paradox 
of embedded agency, that is, to the structure-agency debate. In the following discussion, we 
highlight our contributions to the question of how actors can influence the institutional structure 
in which they are embedded. At a general level, our findings confirm Sewell’s proposition that 
”agency [is]…the capacity to transpose and extend schemas to new contexts” (1992: 18). By 
transposition, he means that schemas “can be applied to a wide and not fully predictable range of 
cases outside the contexts in which they are initially learned” (Sewell, 1992:17). At a more 
specific level, our empirical findings allow us to propose a more elaborate account of the 
transposition process. Below we discuss in turn what we propose an alternative institutional 
pattern to be, why it is made, and finally how actors go about making it. These propositions 
assume, of course, that our findings are generalizable.  
 We propose that an alternative institutional pattern is a means-end designation that is 
transposed from another field. An alternative institutional pattern is thus not new in an absolute 
sense, but is a combination of available institutional elements. Seo and Creed (2002) have made a 
similar proposal, suggesting that embedded agents may change structures by “artfully 
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mobiliz[ing] different institutional logics and resources, appropriated from their contradictory 
institutional environments.” (p. 240). The transposed elements are primarily cognitive 
institutions, be they schemas (Sewell, 1992) or institutional logics (Seo & Creed, 2002). To be 
considered as an alternative institutional pattern, a transposed cognitive institution must be 
recognized in the focal field as innovative and legitimate. This apparently requires that it be 
combined with an institutional logic in the focal field. Hargadon and Douglas (2001) came to a 
similar conclusion in their empirical study of Edison’s innovation of electric lighting.   
The motivation of actors who propose an alternative institutional pattern is apparently to 
solve a field-level problem that has proved resistant to traditional solutions. The initial motivation 
to solve a field-level problem may be followed by a motivation to change institutions if the latter 
are perceived to prevent the diffusion, adoption or implementation of an alternative solution. 
Hence, the motivation to change institutions may well be tied directly to problem solving. 
Previous work on the paradox of embedded agency suggests that motivation is either 
institutionally determined or naturally given prior to the existence of institutions. For instance, 
Seo and Creed (2002) propose that the generation of an alternative institutional pattern is driven 
by the self-interest of actors who are marginalized, oppressed or deprived by existing institutions. 
We find little support for this proposal in that the innovative actor in our case study was not 
marginalized, oppressed, or deprived in any sense of these words. The other position is that 
institutions determine actor interests. We found some support for this proposal. The actor’s 
motivation was to solve an already recognized field-level problem, an agenda that is located 
within institutional boundaries. However, multiple embeddedness allowed her to exercise some 
choice, which suggests that actor interests are not necessarily determined by institutions, though 
they are apparently bounded by them.  
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Our findings support the proposition that states that multiple embeddedness is a 
precondition for generating an alternative institutional pattern (Battilana, 2004). Seo and Creed 
(2002) have made a similar proposal, though they suggest that the multiplicity of institutions is 
dialectically generated at the field level. In contrast, we find the multiplicity to be generated at 
the individual level and to result from multiple embeddedness. Our findings are thus more 
congruent with the notion of secondary socialization, proposed by Berger and Luckmann (1967: 
138-146). Secondary socialization is the process of becoming embedded in a new field after 
primary socialization during childhood. If the institutions in the second field contrasts with those 
of the primary field, actors will generally abstain from becoming embedded in the second field. 
However, if they do, they are required to do alternation, which is the demanding process of 
relating institutions in a primary field with contradictory institutions in a secondary field (Berger 
& Luckmann, 1967: 157-163). Alternation is necessary for individuals to establish coherence in 
their biography and hence to maintain a sense of identity (ibid). The notions of alternation and 
multiple embeddedness are not only compatible with our findings; they also offer a plausible 
explanation for the empirical observation that a reproductive capacity seems more common in 
individuals than an innovative capacity.  
The final question is how actors proceed to develop an alternative institutional pattern. 
Once embedded in multiple fields, actors develop a cognitive repertoire that multiple institutional 
logics.  These institutional logics are the building blocks of an alternative institutional pattern, but 
how does the process unfold? Seo and Creed call this process “artful” (see quote on p. 24) and 
admit that their work “does not specify the concrete processes and mechanisms through which 
social actors … ultimately cultivate new, well-established institutional arrangements” (Seo & 
Creed, 2002: 243). Based on our case study findings, we propose that the transposition process is 
one of establishing similarity between fields and between ends, but not means, in two means-end 
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designations. These parallels apparently allow actors to select and then transpose a means-end 
designation from one field to the other. In general, we propose that actors may transpose an 
institutional logic from field A to field B if the two fields are recognized as being similar to one 
another and if their institutional logics have similar ends but divergent means. A transposition 
may occur if means A is perceived as more effective than means B, and if means A is sufficiently 
legitimate in field B to be recognized as innovative and progressive in this field. Other 
transposition processes and conditions may be possible as well. Since our proposition is derived 
from a single case study, further empirical investigation is needed to validate the processes 
through which actors select and transpose institutional elements and then generate alternative 
institutional patterns from these elements.    
In conclusion, we suggest that our proposition regarding the innovative capacity of 
institutional entrepreneurs is more compatible with neo-institutional theory than it is with rational 
actor models. Rational actor models propose that actors are able to set goals that are independent 
of institutions, generate multiple means to reach this goal, and then select the mean they perceive 
to be objectively most efficacious for reaching this goal. Our proposition implies that actors do 
not set goals independent of the institutions in which they are embedded, and that they do not 
generate a list of potential means from which they select the apparently most efficacious one. 
Hence, our findings break with rational actor models. Though rational actor models may explain 
our findings with the notions of sufficing behavior and bounded rationality, we doubt that actors 
are indeed capable of generating means and ends that lie outside of the institutions in which 
actors are embedded. Empirical examples that demonstrate otherwise are required to lend support 
to rational actor models. That being said, rational actor models are compatible with our findings 
to the extent that rationality is recognized as being institutionally bounded and confined to the 
cognitive repertoire of a given actor. Actors may indeed perceive themselves to act rationally in 
 27
an objective sense, but since their perceptions are likely to be shaped in important ways by 
institutions, their rationality is largely restricted to consistent behavior, logical thought, and an 
ability to contrast the imagined outcomes of a few alternative means, available to actors that have 
achieved multiple embeddedness. These dimensions of rationality can hardly be considered 
sufficient for lending support to rational actor models. They are better conveyed by the notion of 
practical-evaluative capacity (Emirbayer & Mische, 1998) than by rational choice. However, if 
seen as institutionally bounded, rationality may fruitfully complement neo-institutional theory at 
an individual level of analysis, that is, in the concept of institutional entrepreneurs.   
 
CONCLUSION 
The purpose of this paper was to develop a better understanding of the innovative capacity 
of institutional entrepreneurs. We provided an empirically grounded account of how an 
embedded actor innovated, i.e. how she came to conceive of an alternative institutional pattern 
that differed from the institutional logic in the field. Our most important contribution, we believe, 
consists in the proposition that actors need to be embedded in multiple fields to activate their 
innovative capacity. We propose that the innovative capacity, once activated, enables actors to 
transpose a means-end designation across fields in so far as they perceive an occasion for 
problem-solving, establish similarity between fields, and identify two means-end designations 
with similar goals and divergent means. To be recognized in the focal field as an alternative 
institutional pattern, the transposed means-end designation must apparently be seen as 
sufficiently legitimate and relatively more efficacious than the established institutional logic, 
which requires that it is aligned with the general direction of institutional change in the focal 
field. Through this innovative process, embedded actors may generate an alternative institutional 
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pattern that may later become institutionalized through a long and complex process that we have 
not addressed in this paper. 
The implication of our proposal is that actors who are embedded in multiple fields appear to 
have higher innovative capacity than other actors. The reason may be that multiple embeddedness 
extends the cognitive repertoire that actors draw upon to develop alternative institutional patterns.  
That is, the innovative capacity is apparently bounded by institutions. Once embedded in multiple 
fields, actors may exercise some choice over which elements they transpose. However, their 
range of choices remains rather limited. Also, actors may exercise an innovative capacity without 
displaying self-awareness and deliberate intent to innovate.    
Deliberate intent is crucial, however, for an innovative actor to be considered an 
institutional entrepreneur. Actors may, or may not, use their innovative capacity to influence the 
direction or speed of institutional change. Only if there is deliberate intent to cause institutional 
change is it reasonable to consider a transposing actor to be an institutional entrepreneur. Even 
then, individual actors play only a partial role in institutional change processes, given the 
multiple contextual conditions required to activate and exercise their innovative capacity.  
Our proposed contribution to the literature on institutional entrepreneurship is a revised 
definition of institutional entrepreneurs that is more compatible with the premises of neo-
institutional theory than the definition proposed by DiMaggio (1988). Although we focused 
exclusively on the innovative dimension in the frame of this paper, the role that institutional 
entrepreneurs play in diffusion processes should of course not be neglected. Hence, our 
preliminary proposal is that institutional entrepreneurs are institutionally bounded agents who a) 
transpose an institutional logic across fields and introduce it as a deliberate alternative to the 
institutional logic in the focal field, or b) deliberately seek to diffuse an alternative logic within a 
field. This definition is an improved version of DiMaggio’s definition, we believe, not only 
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because it is empirically derived, but also because it encompasses divergent motives and 
differentiates between the processes of innovation and diffusion (see e.g. Scott, 1994b: 83). It 
also emphasizes the institutionally embedded nature of entrepreneurial action, while DiMaggio’s 
definition focuses on resources and actor motives, which make allusions to rational agent models.  
In sum, we consider our study on the innovative capacity of embedded actors to advance 
institutional entrepreneurship as an endogenous theory of institutional change. We believe to 
have taken an important step in this direction by showing how innovative capacity is compatible 
with institutionally bounded agency. Future research on institutional entrepreneurship may well 
pursue this line of inquiry by exploring other core capacities of embedded agents, such as the 
ones they mobilize for diffusing alternative institutional patterns in a field.  
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Time Event – society Event – project Event - individual 
1994 Social Democratic 
government launches  
CSR campaign  
  
1995   Actor leaves field for United 
States/ World Bank 
2000 Problem of integrating 
immigrants moves to top 
of political agenda 
  
2000   Actor returns to field and 
searches for solution to field-
level problem 
2001 Precipitating events:       
a) election of Liberal 
government in Denmark    
b) publication of Green 
Paper on CSR by 
European Commission 
Initiators meet, 
formulate an innovative 
project, and receive 
preliminary funding 
from European Union 
fund and from two 
participating firms 
Actor develops alternative 
institutional pattern by 
transposing a means-end 
designation from United States/ 
World Bank to Denmark 
Winter  
2001-
2002 
 Project group forms, 
holds meetings, and 
submits a substantial 
funding application  
 
Spring 
2002 
 Full funding is granted 
for three years; project 
implementation begins 
 
Fall 
2002 
Liberal government 
adopts new CSR policy 
that is aligned with the 
orientation of the 
innovative project 
  
 
Table 1: Chronological events divided by level of analysis. 
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Figure 1: Keyword search on ‘integration and immigrants’ in Berlingske Tidende (national daily 
newspaper). 
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Figure 2: Institutional logic underpinning ‘corporate social responsibility’ campaign 
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Articles on ‘corporate social responsibility’         
in Berlingske Tidende 1994-2000
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Figure 3: Results of a keyword search on ‘corporate social responsibility’ in Berlingske 
Tidende. 
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Individualized human 
resource management  
 
as manifested by recruitment and 
development of employees with 
undeveloped human potential, 
reinforced by an individualized 
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Figure 4:  Institutional logic underpinning ‘diversity management’. 
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development of the 
welfare state in so 
much as it overlaps 
with financial firm 
performance (win-
win). 
Individualized human 
resource management  
 
as manifested by recruitment 
and development of 
employees with undeveloped 
human potential, reinforced 
by an individualized 
management style. 
            
 
 
                
 
Figure 5:  Alternative means-ends designation, resulting from a combination of two 
institutional logics.  
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igure 6:  Danish institutional logic of equality.  
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Danish entries on ’diversity management’
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Figure 7:  Keyword search on Danish entries on ’diversity management’ in Berlingske 
Tidende, a Danish newspaper, and the library database of Copenhagen Business School. 
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